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The Politics of Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime
PATRICIA H. DAvIs*
"I don't want to live, I wish someone would take my soul away."-Albanian girl who was raped
by Serb soldiers.'
"[If she admitted being raped] I would ask for a divorce-even if I had 20 children. I don't
hate her, but the story is before my eyes. I feel very cold toward her. [Kissing her] is like kissing
a dead body."-Husband of a 22-year-old Muslim woman who denies being raped by Serb
soldiers.'
"... when the rapes started they lost all hope. Until then they had hope that this war could
pass, that everything would quiet down. When the rapes started, everybody lost hope, every-
body in the camp, men and women. There was such fear, horrible."-A medical worker at the
Trnopolje camp.'
"We were having fun. [The women] weren't forced to do it; they wanted to do it ... They
didn't speak our language, but they weren't complaining. They are animals, they could take a
lot."-"Jastreb," a paramilitary soldier in Kosovo talking about Albanian women.
4
I. Introduction
In recent years the general public has become more aware than ever before of one of the
oldest and most horrible aspects of war-rape and sexual assault. News reports of the con-
flicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda have exposed combatants using the rape of
civilians as a means of waging war. In Bosnia-Herzogovina, a breakaway republic of Yu-
goslavia, stories of mass rapes, forced impregnations, and rumors of ethnic cleansing cir-
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culated together.' Revelations about concentration camps where Croat and Muslim women
were raped repeatedly by Serb soldiers (and, to a more limited extent, by other national
groups) both systematically and at will, became a regular part of the world's daily news
from the region.6 Stories circulated of women who were left vulnerable by the capture and
execution of their husbands and fathers, were terrorized in their towns and villages, or were
transported to central locations where they were targets for sexual violence, including forced
impregnations.
Stories of rape along with reports of mass systematic killings also surfaced from Rwanda
in 1994. As a part of the attempted genocide of the Tutsis by Hutu officials and soldiers,
where over ten percent of Rwandan citizens were slaughtered, thousands of women and
girls were held, publicly gang-raped, tortured, and then killed.7
In response to these atrocities, the U.N. Security Council commissioned two ad hoc
international tribunals to investigate the crimes and to prosecute those responsible.8 The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993
to investigate, indict, and try those suspected of crimes against humanity in the conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the other wars that marked the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in 1994 to pros-
ecute those responsible for serious violations of international law during the Rwandan civil
war in 1994.
These tribunals are the first since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials following World
War II. The ICTR and ICTY statutes differ from previous statutes, however, because they
specifically enumerate rape as a war crime.9 Both of the tribunals have produced landmark
rulings regarding rape, and they have convicted a number of war criminals/rapists °
5. Siobhan K. Fisher, Occupation of the Womb: Forced Impregnation as Genocide, 46 DUKE L.J. 91, 92 (1996).
6. Roy GUTMAN, MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, ix, ix-xiii (Alexandra
Stigimayer ed., Marion Faber trans., 1994) [hereinafter MAss RAPE].
7. U.S. Lawyer: A Champion of Victims in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, available at 1998 VVL 22330625.
8. The war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia were established by the U.N. Security
Council under its Chapter VII powers. The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo-
slavia since 1991 was established in The Hague, the Netherlands. It was adopted unanimously by the Security
Council on May 25, 1993, at its 3217th meeting. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. It is contained
in the Annex to the Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 ofSecurity Council
Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32 I.L.M 1159 (1993). The language
of the Statute is found at 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993).
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
Citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring states,
between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994, was adopted on November 8, 1994, and established in
Arusha, Tanzania [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, art.
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M 1598.
9. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention included rape as an "attack on [women's] honor." Geneva
Convention, art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. This categorization of rape as a crime
of dishonoring is problematic, because it seemingly has the virginity or chastity of the woman/victim as a
precondition, and it also implies that a woman, once raped, becomes dishonorable. See Rhonda Copelon,
Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes Against Women in Time of War, in MAss RAPE, supra note 6,197,200.
10. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T (1997) [hereinafter Tadic]; Prosecutor v. Furundzija,
No. IT-95-17/1 -T10 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/ICTY/furndzija/trialc2; Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
No. ICTR-96-4-T, ICTR (1996).
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Despite this seeming progress, however, the tribunals have been ineffective in actually
obtaining justice in the form of convictions of perpetrators for all of the thousands of women
who were brutally sexually assaulted as a part of these conflicts." Few trials of important
figures or military personnel have been brought against those who should ultimately be
held responsible.
There are many complex reasons why the tribunals have been ineffective so far in pros-
ecuting those charged with rape. Among the most important reason is that the courts and
prosecutors have limited funds and resources. Furthermore, they do not receive unqualified
support by the countries in which they operate.
Some countries to which indicted criminals have fled and taken refuge do not cooperate
in arresting and returning criminals to the courts. When those indicted are arrested, trials
are often slowed down considerably by the necessity of developing procedures and prece-
dent as the trials proceed. To make matters worse, it has been almost impossible for pros-
ecutors to find witnesses willing to testify against those who have been prosecuted for sexual
crimes.
This comment focuses on one kind of difficulty encountered by the war crimes tribunals
in prosecuting rape as a war crime-political controversy. It argues that there are multiple
political barriers involved in prosecuting war criminals for the crime of rape. These barriers
exist on different levels-from the general controversy about the establishment of inter-
national tribunals, to the lack of political will to prosecute rape when other atrocities are
also alleged, to the difficulties confronted by both the prosecutors and the survivors/wit-
nesses in the course of actually trying rapists as a part of a war crimes trial.
The paper begins with a brief discussion of the history of rape as a weapon of war, and
then proceeds to a discussion of the political barriers of prosecuting rape. The first barrier
is the controversy over the place and function of international courts, including debate over
the legitimacy of international criminal jurisprudence. The second controversy is related
to the ways the international tribunals have treated sexual violence in several key trials-
recognizing it, but not giving it the primacy it deserves in prosecutions. The third political
controversy relates to the necessity of changing procedures, office structures, and policies
followed when prosecuting rape, in order to better protect survivors/witnesses. Practical
and procedural issues regarding who is required to testify, whether the testimony can be
from anonymous witnesses, how victims will be protected from further violence in their
communities, and how to balance the special needs of the survivors/witnesses against the
rights of the accused must be given continued serious consideration as the war crime trials
proceed.
H. The History of Rape as a Weapon of War
Rape is a crime unlike many others in that it stigmatizes the victim as well as the per-
petrator. Being raped is a defining experience for women: it causes survivors' communities
to feel differently about them, and it often causes the women to feel differently about
11. See Commission on Human Rights, Preliminary Report Submitted by Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 50th Sess. at 64, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (1994); see also Preliminary
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery, and Slavery-Like Practices During
Periods of Armed Conflict, ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, 48th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 15, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/26 (1996).
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themselves. 2 Being raped is being violated in the most intimate way possible. Being raped
causes women to experience great fear-fear of future harm, fear of retribution from the
perpetrator, and fear of being revealed as a victim. 3
The effects of rape on survivors and their communities have been successfully exploited
by those engaged in war for thousands of years. Rape and other forms of sexual abuse of
conquered women and children have been common, tragic aspects of warfare for as long
as there has been written history of war.'4 The Bible provides many narratives of women
and young girls being sacrificed by their families, raped, and then murdered by enemy
armies in ancient Israel. The Bible records intertribal warfare that involves the capturing
and raping of women as the ultimate signification of victory.'5 Rape is part of the founding
myth of Rome, and was considered by the ancient Greeks to be an acceptable part of war
by which they could gain wives, concubines, or trophies. 6
Rape was a spoil of war during the Crusades. 7 In the Hundred Years War between
England and France, knights were honored for protecting highborn women from rape by
lowborn enemies.' George Washington sentenced a soldier to death for committing rape
during the American Revolution. 9 Rape was used to create terror by the German army
marching through Belgium in World War 1.20 In World War II, the Japanese invasion of
China incorporated rape as a strategy of domination.2'
The modern United States military does not have an unblemished record regarding rape.
According to court-martial statistics, eighty-six rape-related charges were filed against
American soldiers stationed in Vietnam; fifty of these resulted in convictions.2 For many
reasons, including the language barrier and the Vietnamese women's inability to access a
12. See JUDITH LEwIs HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE FROM DOMESTIC
ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 69, 51 (1993). Herman argues that the most devastating psychological damage of
trauma such as rape is that it takes away a person's sense that life has meaning:
Traumatic events call into question basic human relationships. They breach the attachments of family,
friendship, love, and community. They shatter the construction of the self that is formed and sustained
in relation to others. They undermine the belief systems that give meaning to human experience. They
violate the victim's faith in a natural or divine order and cast the victim into a state of existential crisis.
Id. See alsojean A. Hamilton & Jane L. Dolkart, Working Paper on Legal Reform in theArea ofSexualHarassment.
Contributions from Social Science, in SEX AND POWER ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 181, 183 (1992), which points
out that "victims of attempted or completed rape [have] serious mental health problems more frequentiy than
... victims of attempted or completed robbery, or aggravated assault."
13. See id.
14. See generally Nicole E. Erb, Gender-Based Crimes Under the Draft Statute for the Permanent International
Criminal Court, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 401 (1998); Darren A. Nebesar, Gender-Based Violence as a
Weapon of War, 4 U.C. DAvIs J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147 (1998).
15. See, e.g., Judges 20:4-48 (where a daughter and a concubine are offered to rampaging enemies in order
to protect a male guest of a household); Genesis 34:2-29 (where Dinah's rape by "the prince of the land" caused
her brothers to "plunder" the city capturing and making "prey" every part of the land's wealth including "all
their little ones and their wives, and all that was in the houses.").
16. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 33-34 (1975).
17. Idat 31.
18. Id. at 37.
19. Id. at 31.
20. Id. at 32.
21. See generally IRIs CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF WORLD WAR IH
(1997) (giving a detailed historical account of the Japanese invasion of Nanking on December 13, 1947).
22. See Nebesar, supra note 14, at 150.
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legal system that could help them, these figures probably grossly underrepresent the actual
number of rapes that occurred.2 3
Today's headlines repeat the commonplace of rape in war with wearying regularity.
2
*
Reports of rapes of women in refugee camps in western Timor circulate along with news
of systematic killings, torture, forced displacement, and destruction of property by Indo-
nesian armed forces in East Timor." Human Rights Watch, in its report Getting Away with
Murder, Mutilation, and Rape, documents mass rapes and gang rapes of women and young
girls by rebel forces against the government in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in January 1999.26
A Guatemalan truth commission report issued in March 1999 blames the Guatemalan gov-
ernment, including its military, political, and judicial systems, for acts of genocide and gross




Rape in war has been viewed as one of the spoils,2" as an incentive for soldiers to enlist,
and as a way to celebrate victory in battle. 9 It is understood as a part of the rules of the
game, as a means of humiliating male opponents, as a way of reaffirming the manhood of
soldiers, as a means of destroying the opponent's culture, and as a way for soldiers to act
out their deep-seated contempt for women in general. 3° Repeated rapes and the consequent




For combatants, rape has been the ultimate mark of pain and humiliation-hurting (and
often killing) the women and shaming the nation. Rape has served the tactical function of
demonstrating the totality of victory over enemies.
32
In one act of aggression, the collective spirit of women and of the nation is broken, leaving a
reminder long after the troops depart. And if she survives the assault, what does the victim of
wartime rape become to her people? Evidence of the enemy's bestiality. Symbol of her nation's
defeat. A pariah. Damaged Property. A pawn in the subtle wars of international propaganda."
In spite of the devastating effects of rape as a weapon of war, it has been overlooked by
the international community until recently. The two modern conflicts focused on in this
23. BROWNMILLER, supIa note 16, at 86-113.
24. See Barbara Crossette, An Old Scourge of War Becomes Its Latest Crime, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1998, at A4
(discussing implications of the trend that modem wars are fought in neighborhoods, including that women are
made more vulnerable to attack).
25. Adele Horin, Indict Those Murderers, Before the Blood Dries, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 18, 1999,
at 45; see also Doug Struck & Keith B. Richburg, Refugees Describe Method to Murderous Rampage in E. Timor,
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1999, at Al. The East Timorese are lobbying the United Nations to try to prevent a
new war crimes tribunal from being established there. See War Criminals Walk Free as Plans for New Court Stall,
U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 18, 2000, at A14.
26. New Testimonies on Mutilation, Rape of Civilians, AFR. News SERVIcE, June 27, 1999, available at 1999 WL
21216033. According to this report girls under seventeen, and especially those thought to be virgins, were
targeted.
27. Mireya Navarro, Pain of War for Guatemalans Isn't Over, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, available at 1999
WL 9872828.
28. Id.
29. Simon Chesterman, Never Again... and Again: Law, Order, and the Gender of War Crimes in Bosnia and
Beyond, 22 YALEJ. INT'L L. 299, 325 (1997).
30. Ruth Seifert, War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis, in MAss RAPE, supra note 6, at 54, 58-66.
31. Forced impregnation results from such tactics as withdrawing or withholding contraception from the
women being raped, and is enforced by the detention of pregnant women beyond the time when they could
safely receive abortions. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 93.
32. Chesterman, supra note 29, at 325.
33. Susan Brownmiller, Making Female Bodies the Battlefield, in MAss RAPE, supra note 6, at 180, 181.
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paper-the war in the former Yugoslavia and the conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu tribes
in Rwanda-have galvanized international attention and put the issue of rape in war at the
forefront of the public's consciousness. In both of these conflicts, the rape of captured
civilian women (and men) has seemingly been so systematic, so common, and even seem-
ingly so bureaucratized that rape is clearly revealed as a major weapon in the arsenals of
these combatants.
The prosecution of rape used as a weapon of war, however, is not a simple matter. The
political environment in which both of the international tribunals operate impinges directly
on their effectiveness in securing justice for the survivors of rape.
The following is a description of three different levels of political controversy that touch
on the tribunals' work: (1) controversy over the very existence and function of the tribunals
and the proposed permanent international criminal court (hereinafter ICC), 4 (2) contro-
versy over the policies and procedures for prosecuting rape being developed by the tribu-
nals, and (3) controversy over the protection of survivors/witnesses.
M. Level One Political Controversy: The Existence
and Function of the International Tribunals
and the Proposed International Criminal Court
The International Committee of the Red Cross" defines international humanitarian
law as:
[Mnternational rules, established by treaties or custom, which are specifically intended to solve
humanitarian problems directly arising from international or noninternational armed conflicts
and which, for humanitarian reasons, limit the right of Parties to a conflict to use the methods
and means of warfare of their choice or protect persons and property that are, or may be,
affected by conflict.
36
Modern international humanitarian law as it is now formulated came into being following
World War II as an effort to deter the kinds of horrors (including concentration camps,
genocide, and terror bombings) associated with that war. These international codes were
intended to be "a firebreak between civilization and barbarism" for Western countries-a
way to distinguish the proper from the improper conduct of war."
International humanitarian law has traditionally been divided into two types: that which
protects victims of war, and that which governs the means and conduct of war itself.38
34. In December 1995, the U.N. General Assembly established the Preparatory Committee on the Estab-
lishment of a Criminal Court. See G.A. Res. 50/46, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc A/Res/50/46 (1995).
This committee resulted in the July 1998 Rome Treaty that discusses the requirements of the Rome Treaty's
ratification. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Crim-
inal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 126, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
35. The Red Cross, along with national governments and militaries, has historically been a major player in
efforts to curb war atrocities and to implement international standards of conduct. See CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT
THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds.), quoted in Viewpoints, NEWSDAY, Aug. 10, 1999,
at A35.
36. William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
767, 770 (1999).
37. Gutman, supra note 35, at A35.
38. Fenrick, supra note 36, at 770-71.
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Humanitarian law has traditionally concerned itself with international conflicts, although,
as the Red Cross Commentary on Geneva notes, noninternational conflicts can also come
under scrutiny.3 9
The controversy over the legitimacy and function of the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR takes
various forms. Most of these harken back to a question of national sovereignty: what is each
nation's prerogative to conduct war and to prosecute war criminals according to its own
laws and perceived best interests? Those who oppose international criminal jurisdiction in
matters of warfare do so to protect nations' rights to wage international war and to use
force in internal conflicts without external control or oversight.
Although the question of the existence and function of international tribunals is some-
what moot with regard to the ICTY and the ICTR, as they have already been created and
have been functioning since the early 1990s, the continuing controversy about their legit-
imacy (especially as it relates to U.N. efforts to establish the ICC) provides a constant
political undertow for both tribunals. Even as the tribunals attempt to move forward, con-
troversy over the role of the United Nations in prosecuting international criminals calls
into question the legitimacy of the tribunals' actions, and this controversy affects the ways
in which countries involved participate in and/or cooperate with the tribunals' investigations
and trials. 4"
Jose E. Alvarez argues that the battles between those who support the tribunals and the
ICC and those who are suspicious of them are occasioned by the different political philos-
ophies held by the parties. 4' "Legalists" believe that law is more important than national
sovereignty; "realists" believe in the supremacy of the sovereign state.
42
A. "LEGALISTS" ARGUMENTS FOR THE CREATION OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS
Legalists are those who argue for the maintenance of the ICTY and ICTR and for the
creation of a permanent international criminal court.43 Legal realists Roy Gutman and
David Rieff equate international criminal law with the most important achievements of
humankind: "Whatever structures of world politics emerge in the next century, the laws of
war belong to everyone. They are among the great achievements of civilization and, in this
era of uncertainty and disorder, more relevant than ever."-
Legalists advocate for the tribunals and the ICC because they believe international pres-
sure is necessary to deter war crimes and other crimes against humanity4s This deterrence
takes place through several functions of international courts of law. First, the courts bring
war crimes into the open.46 The tribunals (and the possibility of a permanent ICC) bring
the expectation that war crimes would be forcefully exposedY7 Gutman and Rieff quote
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., SenatorJesse Helms, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council (Jan. 20,2000) (transcript
available at FED. NEWS SERV.).
41. Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessonsfrom Rwanda, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 365,366 (1999).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 370-85.
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Joseph Pulitzer on this point: "There is not a crime which does not live in secrecy. Get
these things out in the open, describe them, attack them, ridicule them in the press, and
sooner or later, public opinion will sweep them away."41
The second function of a permanent ICC is to facilitate the expedient prosecution of
war crimes, because it would not have to begin prosecutions by establishing bureaucracies
or by dealing with the "geopolitical pressure" of working in the geographic area of the
crimes.49 It would have an investigation arm already in place, and it would have the financial
resources, people, buildings, and equipment to begin investigation and prosecution almost
immediately after crimes are alleged.1°
In addition, the ICC would bring criminals to justice who would not otherwise be pros-
ecuted because of national disincentives to do so. "An International Criminal Court...
would make it possible to bring to justice those who engage in the most heinous crimes-
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and terrorism-even if the perpetrator is a
national of a state that condones, encourages, or supports the conduct.""'
In addition to these primary goals, the proponents of the ICC believe that a permanent
court is important because it would be among the first international judicial entities to focus
on individuals. It would bring justice to individuals who died or were victimized in other
ways and would allow the living victims and the families of the living and the dead to begin
the healing process." It would also prosecute individuals for the crimes that they committed
or for which they were responsible:
For centuries... [i]nternational law did not protect individuals, and, with the notable exception
of piracy, it did not criminalize acts by individuals ... [There are now international treaties
which] establish that individuals have rights under international law-rights even against their
own states-and that individuals are accountable under international law.53
Legalists also argue that international tribunals and the ICC will establish an accurate
historical record of the conflict and the crimes.54 The ICC should "establish a historical
record of what occurred in the war, naming the principal perpetrators and posting their
names on a wanted list for decades to come."5 This record would serve to remind the
public of who remains on the "wanted list" in addition to providing guidance for future
prosecutions of these kinds of crimes.5 6
B. "REALISTS" RESISTANCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS
AND THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The most persistent arguments against the tribunals and the establishment of the ICC
have come from legal realists in the United States and their allies in countries that are
48. Id.
49. War Criminal Walks Free as Plans for New Court Stall, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 18, 2000, at A14.
50. See id.
51. Malvina Halberstam, Association ofAmerican Law Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court, 36 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 223 (1999).
52. Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the TadicJudgment, 96 Micn. L. REV. 2031, 2031 (1998).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2032.
55. GUTMAN, supra note 6, at ix.
56. See Askin, supra note 3, at 98.
VOL. 34, NO. 4
THE POLITICS OF PROSECUTING RAPE AS A WAR CRIME 1231
closely aligned to U.S. foreign interests." These realists are fearful that if the international
courts become successful in achieving enforcement power, this power might be politicized
and used against countries such as the United States and its allies."s They believe the real
agenda of the United Nations in establishing the ICC and the tribunals is restraining U.S.
military power, and they resent that a permanent international court would expose U.S.
forces sent overseas to prosecution outside of the American judicial system. 9 In addition,
they believe that for U.S. citizens, these courts create supra-constitutional powers and au-
thorities whose intentions and rulings may be in conflict with citizens' constitutional rights
in the United States.60
Edward M. Wise expresses the realist position on this issue: "For those for whom the
nation-state remains the fundamental form of political organization on this planet, [the
ICC] is a distressing development; it is positively pernicious insofar as the [ICC] Statute
can be applied to nationals of non-parties without their states' consent."
6
1
The realists' fears have been exacerbated by the recent controversy over the U.S. bomb-
ings in the former Yugoslavia 62 and the announcement that the ICTY's chief prosecutor
was considering a formal investigation into charges against the NATO alliance.63 These
charges alleged that NATO's bombings violated the Geneva conventions because they were
conducted from very high altitude-increasing the probability of mistakes and civilian ca-
sualties.64 Realists argue that under this kind of reasoning, if Germany had won World
War II, the pilot and bombers of the Enola Gay might have faced war crimes prosecution
for bombing civilians in Japan.
6 s
In opposition to the legalist argument that international tribunals deter war crimes, the
realists argue that even if a court had real political power, the worst war crimes perpetrators
(such as Hider, Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein, and Slobodan Milosevic) would not be deterred
by it since they are not even deterred by acts of warfare against themselves.- Any hope that
the ICC might deter these kind of leaders is false, and it could be dangerous if it is relied
upon. 67
In addition, the realists argue that the ICC's jurisdiction, as it is now contemplated, would
be too limited to accomplish its own aims.
6 s
[E]xcept in cases referred by the Security Council, the Court's jurisdiction depends on the
consent of the state on whose territory the crimes took place or the state of which the accused
57. See John Bolton, Flaws Undermine Concept, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 18, 2000, at Al 4.
58. Id.
59. Steven Lee Myers, Kosovo Inquiry Confirms U.S. Fears of War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2000,
at A6.
60. Bolton, supra note 57, at AI4.
61. Edward M. Wise, Association of American law Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court, 36 AM.
CRIM. L. Rov. 223 (1999).
62. Id.
63. This is especially ironic given that the United States has been the greatest supporter of the ITCY and
has provided more of its operating funds, personnel, and political support than any other nation in the NATO
Alliance. See Michael P. Scharf, Trial and Error: An Assessment of the First jaudgment of the Yugoslavia War Crimes
Tribunal, 30 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 167, 173 (1997-98) (discussing U.S. support of the tribunals).
64. War-Crimes Investigation of NATO Angers Members, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 21, 2000, at A16.
65. The Morality of Warfare: Is Closer Necessarily Worse?, THE ECONOMIST, July 17, 1999, available at 1999
VAL 7363840.
66. Bolton, supra note 57, at A14.
67. Id.
68. See Rome Statute, supra note 34.
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is a national, which effectively deprives the Court of jurisdiction over the people who are likely
to be the most obvious suspects, the future Pol Pots who massacre their own people on their
own territory.
69
Finally, realists argue that in some cases countries (like South Africa) that have been
ravaged by atrocities and crimes of war might decide that peace and reconciliation is a
better course than protracted prosecutions of war criminals.70 For the realists, this choice
should be available to all sovereign nations; international courts should not be imposed on
them.
C. PROSECUTING RAPE AS A WAR CRIME
The battle between legalists and realists continues to be waged at a high level of intensity.
The ICTY and ICTR, bodies that are just beginning to define the concept of rape as a war
crime, function in the shadow of these heated controversies.
In his recent address to the U.N. Security Council, Jesse Helms (the first American
Senator ever invited to address this body) put the struggle of the international courts in
sharp relief. In his very strongly worded view, the proper function of the United Nations
is merely to be one of a number of aspects of American diplomacy:
The American people will never accept the claims of the United Nations to be the sole source
of legitimacy on the use of force in this world. [Miost Americans... do not regard the United
Nations as an end in and of itself. They see it as just one aspect of America's diplomatic
arsenal.7
His remarks to the Security Council ended with a scathing denunciation of the Rome
Statute proposal for the ICC based on his realist notion of the sovereignty of the United
States:
The Rome Treaty [of the ICC] purports to hold American citizens under its jurisdiction even
when the United States has neither signed nor ratified that treaty. Nonsense. In other words,
Rome claims sovereign authority over American citizens without their consent. How can the
nations of the world imagine for one instant that America's going to stand by and allow such
a power grab to take place? I guarantee you it's not going to happen. With this brave new
world of global justice which proposes a system in which individual prosecutors and judges,
answerable to no state or institution, have somehow unfettered power to sit in judgment of
the foreign policy decision of Western democracies, no U.N. institution-not the Security
Council, not the Yugoslav tribunal, not the future ICC-is competent to judge the foreign
policy and national security decisions of the United States of America.72
69. Wise, supra note 61, at 223.
70. See BIsHoP DESMOND Ttrru, No FUTURE WITHOUr FORGEoNESS 19 (1999), where he talks about the
reasons that South Africa did not pursue prosecutions for those who had committed atrocities against black
people after the negotiated settlement: "[After April 27, 1994, and the creation of the new state] there were
those who wanted to follow the Nuremberg trial paradigm.... This, it turned out, was really not a viable
option at all, perhaps mercifully for us in South Africa." Id. at 19-20. "There would have been no negotiated
settlement and so no new democratic South Africa had the negotiators on one side insisted that all people be
brought to trial. While the Allies could pack up and go home after Nuremberg, we in South Africa had to live
with one another." Id. at 21. "Social harmony is for us the summum bonum-the greatest good ... To forgive
is not just to be altruistic, it is the best form of self-interest." Id. at 31.
71. Helms, supra note 40.
72. Id.
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For Helms, the United Nations, when operating properly, subordinates its own interests
to the interests of its sovereign states, especially the United States.13 The ICTY, ICTR, and
ICC are seen as extremely threatening because of their potential power to sit in judgment
over U.S. foreign policy and national security.
4
Any prosecution of rape as a war crime in the ICTY, ICTR, or ICC will be made much
more difficult by the undertow created by these kinds of philosophical/political battles. A
court that does not have a high degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the international com-
munity will have less power to address controversial issues. It will also be more likely to be
influenced by those who view sexual crimes in war in the more traditional way-as a natural
outcome of the horrible process of war, and not as a crime against humanity." As will be
shown in the next section of this comment, the fight to protect women from sexual violence
in war is an uphill battle. To be as effective as possible in prosecuting rape and sexual
violence as international crimes, international tribunals and the ICC need to be seen as
legitimate forces of a substantially unified international will for justice.
IV. Level Two Political Controversy: Establishing Rape
as a War Crime in International Tribunals and the ICC
According to women's advocates, one of the main obstacles to the prosecution of rape
asa war crime in previous tribunals has been the absence of women in high-level capacities
and the concomitant absence of awareness of the seriousness of gender crimes.76 Both the
Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials substantially ignored rape and gender-based
crimes.77 At Nuremberg, rape crimes were not treated as seriously as the "crimes against
humanity"-the mass killing of Jews and other non-Aryans."8 One theory about why this
is so speculates that the Allies did not want to begin prosecuting the Nazis for crimes that
the Allied troops also committed.79 Because crimes of sexual violence were not prosecuted
at Nuremberg, no precedents were set for trying these kinds of crimes.80
The Tokyo Trial began during the Nuremberg Trial, but concluded in 1948, two years
after Nuremberg ended.8' The judges in the Tokyo Trial consciously adopted the laws,
principles, and precedent of the Nuremberg Trial so "as not to open the door to controversy
by way of conflicting interpretation." 2
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Alvarez, supra note 41, at 381.
mhose who admit that gender-specific violence has occurred but resist calls for outside intervention
either to prevent its reoccurrence or to punish perpetrators seem to be suggesting, at least sub-rosa,
that "boys will be boys" or that rape and sexual assaults are endemic to war and impossible to eradicate.
Id.
76. Askin, supra note 3, at 98.
77. Id.
78. KELLY DAwN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 162 (1997).
79. Id. at 163.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 202.
82. AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION, A STUDY OF THE LEGAL CONCEPT: ITS DEVELOPMENT
AND DEFINITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 161 n.172, (1979).
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Unlike Nuremberg, the Tokyo Trial did establish a precedent for prosecuting rape. 3 It
also gave specific and graphic accounts of the numerous and brutal mass rapes perpetrated
on Chinese women by the Japanese military and made these a matter of public record.8 4
However, even with the specific awareness of the massive number of sexual crimes com-
mitted by the Japanese, sexual violence and rape remained a secondary war crime in the
Tokyo Trial included as part of "inhumane treatment," "ill-treatment," and "failure to re-
spect family honor and rights." Sexual crimes were not specifically enumerated in the Tokyo
charter."s
By contrast, in the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where women serve
at the highest levels as judges and prosecutors,86 several indictments related specifically to
sexual crimes against women and children have been brought." Unlike Nuremberg, these
indictments have provided detailed, graphic, horrific, and public accounts of the allegations
against those being tried.8
Women's advocates applaud the ICTY and ICTR for these accounts, because they will
keep the public's eyes focused on sexual crimes. They also applaud the inclusion of these
accounts as a way to make sure that the sexual crimes that occur as a part of international
conflict will continue to be focused on-and not lost in the analysis of other crimes-in
international courts of law. 9
A. Two TRIBUNALS: THREE LANDMARK TRIALS
1. The International Tribunal for Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia
The ICTY, based in The Hague, Netherlands, was established by the U.N. Security
Council in 1993 for the prosecution of crimes committed during the conflict in Yugoslavia
that began in 1991.90 Unlike the Nuremberg Tribunals that were established after the end
of World War II (upon which they are based), the ICTY was created and established in the
midst of the warfare in the former Yugoslavia. 91
The Serbian objective of the conflict was to create pure Serbian territories in the former
Yugoslavia by expelling Muslims and Croats from their homelands. 92 The result was 3.5
million refugees and internally displaced persons and tens of thousands of Muslims and
Croats who were killed.93 Ethnic cleansing seemed to be one of the main goals of the
conflict, and rape was one of the main weapons used to obtain that goal.-
83. ASKIN, supra note 78, at 203.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 202.




90. ICTY Statute, supra note 8.
91. Critics of NATO claim that it was created because of the failure of NATO to provide militaryassistance
to the Muslims and Croats that might have prevented the alleged atrocities. Human Rights Watch founder
Aryeh Neier argues that the Security Council performed "the right deeds for the wrong reasons"-to avoid
taking a stronger stand to stop atrocities. ARVEH NEER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE I I I (1998).
92. See Alexandra Stiglmayer, The War in the Former Yugoslavia, in MAss RPE, supra note 6, at 1, 14-22 for
a short history of the conflict.
93. Id. at 17.
94. Id.
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To date, the ICTY has indicted eighty-nine individuals and twenty-seven have been ar-
rested.9 Only one has been convicted and jailed: Drazen Erdemovic, a Bosnian Croat who
served with the Bosnian Serb army, was sentenced to ten years after he pleaded guilty to
participating in the execution of Muslims in Srebrenica. 96 His sentence was reduced to five
years on appeal. Six others have been convicted of offenses such as torture, rape, murder,
and serious injury; they are being held at The Hague awaiting the outcome of appeals. 97
a. Jurisdiction of the ICTY
The U.N. Security Council gave the ICTY authority to try alleged offenders for crimes
enumerated in articles 2-5 of its Statute: 98 (i) grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion, (ii) violations of the laws or customs of war, (iii) genocide, and (iv) crimes against
humanity.-
(i) Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949:
These include "wilful killing; torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments; and wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health."' ° The ICTY enumerated the elements of a grave breach in the Dusko
Tadic trial (infra): One of the above-listed crimes must have been committed in the
context of an international armed conflict, and the act must have been committed
against a protected person or property. 0'
(ii) Laws or customs of war (war crimes):
Gender-based crimes in this category consist of violations of Common Article 3 of
the 1949 Geneva Convention which prohibits "violence to life and person, in par-
ticular ... mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment."5 2
(iii) Genocide:
The definition of genocide is taken from the Genocide Convention'03 and repro-
duced in the ICTY Statutes. For the ICTY it means:
95. Stewart PayneJusice Is Served, EVENING STANDARD, July 8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 19547334.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Fenrick, supra note 36, at 768.
99. See ICTY Statute, supra note 8; see also Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Convention], which
requires that women be protected against rape and enforced prostitution; Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
100. Convention, supra note 99.
101. Tadic, supra note 10.
102. Common Article 3 is held in common in all four of the Geneva Conventions: Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, including Annex I,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217,75 U.N.T.S.
85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, including Annexes I-V, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 9, including Annexes I-rn.
103. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, Art. II, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
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any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious groups, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.0 4
Genocide is usually only charged in indictments against senior officers for "hideous"
offenses, because of the very high burden of proof required to show intent to destroy
an entire group. 105
(iv) Crimes against humanity:
These have never been defined specifically in international law.l°6 In the Dusko
Tadic trial (infra), the ICTY set forth the elements necessary to establish a crime
against humanity pursuant to its charter: (a) that one of the charges be for inhumane
acts, murder, rape, enslavement, deportation, persecution for political, racial, na-
tional, religious, or ethnic reasons; (b) that the act be committed in the context of
armed conflict; (c) that at the time of the offense there was widespread "attack" on
the noncombatants which included discrimination; (d) that the accused had knowl-
edge (or should have had knowledge) that he/she was participating in this wider
attack; and (e) that there is individual criminal responsibility.0 7
This marks the first time that rape was specifically recognized as any kind of war crime
offense.
b. Rape as a War Crime in the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia
The news media, the public, and the academy all have noted that there was something
different about the way rape and other sexual violence was perpetrated against women in
the former Yugoslavia. Rape was terribly common; it was institutionalized in the detention
camps; it became a routine but horrible expectation for perpetrators and victims. Women
and girls, who had been left relatively defenseless in their villages after their husbands, sons,
and fathers were deported, were routinely raped. 108 Others were raped in front of their
families. Women were raped in camps set up just for that purpose. 10 9 They were raped
multiple times. They were raped in groups. They were raped alone. They were raped by
multiple perpetrators. They were raped until they lost consciousness. They were raped
until they became pregnant with their rapists' children. They were held in captivity until
they could no longer safely obtain abortions. They were forced into prostitution. "0
Many who have studied the conflict have concluded that in the Yugoslavian conflict, rape
itself had become a weapon of war-a tool of the military in conquering and dispersing the
Muslim and Croat people. Simon Chesterman has summarized the ways in which scholars
and military strategists have viewed rape as a weapon of war in this conflict:
104. Id.
105. See Marsha V. Mills, War Crimes in the 21st Century, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 47, 67 (1999).
106. See Askin, supra note 3, at 97 n.5.
107. Tadic, supra note 10.
108. See ASKIN, supra note 78, at 261-97.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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It [was] at once an instrument of the military objective to drive populations from their homes
and the subject of widespread political propaganda. It [was] used as an instrument of fear as
well as a means of impregnating women (seen to be bearing children of the conqueror's eth-
nicity). In this way, rape function[ed] as both an intimate violation of a woman and a grotesque
public display of domination: The rape of a woman's body symbolically represent[s] the rape
of the community itself."'
Every rape is a horror. In some ways the rapes of Muslim women in Bosnia add horror
upon horror because of the cultural and religious significance for Muslims of women's
sexual purity."2 Even after the modernization and the modification of some of the tradi-
tional norms for women that began taking place in urban areas of Yugoslavia after World
War II, young Muslim women "still respect the commandment of virginity.""' With the
decline of Communism in the region after Tito's death, Muslims began to reinstitutionalize
their traditions. For women, reaffirming the older ways of viewing themselves, including
stricter rules about sexuality, became a matter of community and national pride."
M
Traditional views of women were reaffirmed in Muslim communities in such ways as the
retelling of stories of women who refused to give up their "honor" even when threatened
with death."' One of these stories is about Emina, a young Muslim woman who took up
arms to defend her village against the Serbian Chetniks during World War II; she was not
able to hold them back. When she was apprehended, she reportedly begged, "Only leave
me my honor; I will forgive you my death."'i6 This woman, who saw her "honor" as more
important than her life, is revered as a model Muslim woman.
For a traditional Muslim woman to be raped means that she has become an outsider in
her own family and community, even if she energetically resisted her attacker." 7 She has
become "soiled" or "defiled."", The fact that she has been raped brings dishonor and shame
to herself, her family, and her community." 9 If she is single, she will be considered unmar-
riageable.12° If she is married, she will try to hide the rape from her husband for fear that
he might divorce or even kill her for her impurity.' 21 Under Muslim culture and Islamic
law, if she has become pregnant as the result of rape, the child would be considered non-
Muslim; the ethnicity of the father determines the ethnicity of the child.'
c. Rape as a War Crime in Two Major ICTY Trials
The ICTY, to date, has conducted two major trials that have set important precedents
for the prosecution of rape as a war crime in the former Yugoslavia. In the first trial (of
Dusko Tadic), the ICTY established that aiding and abetting the crime of rape was sufficient
111. Chesterman, supra note 29, at 327-28.
112. See The Final Report of the Commission of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, Annex
T 251, U.N. Doc. S/1994/675, which reports that the majority of rape victims in the Yugoslav conflict are
Muslim women.
113. Azra Zalihic-Kaurin, The Muslim Woman, in MAss RAPE, supra note 6, at 170, 172.
114. Id. at 173.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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to be found guilty of rape.'23 The second trial (of Anto Furundzija) established that the
mental distress suffered by a victim of rape does not automatically disqualify her from being
a competent witness against her rapist.2 4
(i) The Dusko Tadic Trial
Dusko Tadic's trial was the first for the ICTY and the most important for setting pre-
cedent for the future prosecution of rape and crimes of sexual violence, even though Tadic,
himself, was not a high-level officer.25 Tadic was a police functionary (civilian traffic officer)
for the Serbian army during 1992.126 As a result of his actions during the conflict, thirty-
one counts were brought against him including crimes against humanity, grave breaches,
and violations of the laws and customs of war. 7 He pleaded not guilty to all of the
charges.121 On May 7, 1997, he was convicted on eleven of the counts and sentenced to
twenty years in prison. 12 9 Both the defense and the prosecution appealed the judgment. 3 '
The Amended Indictments" I against Tadic that relate to rape or gender crimes included
the following:
Count 1 alleged a crime against humanity (persecution on political, racial, and/or reli-
gious grounds)-for taking part in a "campaign of terror which included killings, torture,
sexual assaults, and other physical and psychological abuse" ' and for participating in "the
torture of more than 12 female detainees, including several gang rapes."'33
Counts 2-4 alleged that Tadic had subjected a woman ("F") to "forcible sexual inter-
course."'13 4 The specific crimes included allegations of a grave breach (inhuman treatment);
violation of the laws or customs of war (cruel treatment), and crime against humanity (rape).
Count 8 alleged a grave breach for torture or inhumane treatment for participating along
with others in beating prisoners, including Fikret Harambasic, and forcing two prisoners
to commit oral sexual acts on Harambasic and to mutilate him sexually.3'
Count 9 alleged a grave breach for willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body and health related to the crimes in Count 8.
123. Tadic, supra note 10.
124. Furundzja, supra note 10.
125. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal onJurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, 81, 84 (Oct. 2, 1995). In the Tadic
trial, the ICTY first found that for article 2 of its Statute to be applicable two requirements had to be met:
(1) the alleged acts must have been committed within the context of an international armed
conflict; and
(2) the alleged victims must have been "protected persons" under the relevant convention.
It found that both of these requirements were met; an international armed conflict was taking place at the
time of the alleged offenses, and the victims were protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention.




130. Scharf, supra note 63, at 168. On January 26, 2000, the tribunal ruled on his appeal and his sentence
was reduced. The judge's ruling stated that his initial sentence was too long, considering his low-level status
in the military. National Public Radio Report (Jan. 26, 2000).
131. Tadic, supra note 10.
132. Id. 1 4.
133. Id. 4.3.
134. Id. 5.
135. Id. T 6.
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Count 10 alleged violations of the laws or customs of war for cruel treatment related to
the same crimes.
Count 11 alleged crimes against humanity for inhumane acts related to the same
crimes. 13
6
Tadic was expected to be the first international alleged war criminal tried for the crime
of rape as a separate charge. The rape charges in Counts 2-4 were dropped, however,
because the victim, Witness F, was too frightened to testify.'37 It is instructive that she felt
threatened even though the judges had granted her such protection as allowing her name
to be withheld from the defense until shortly before the trial, withholding her identity from
the public and the media, and keeping her and her family's whereabouts secret from the
defense and the public.'
Tadic was convicted of eleven of the thirty-one charges against him; he was found guilty
of crimes against humanity pursuant to article 5 of the Statute, and of violations of the laws
or customs of war pursuant to article 3 of the Statute. 39 Eleven of the acquittals were based
on the judges' decision that "grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention were not applicable
to this trial. 14°
Many news organizations reported that because Counts 2-4 were dropped, Tadic was
not convicted of sexual violence charges, but those reports were incorrect.' 4' The convic-
tions that set precedents for later rape prosecutions include those for Counts 1, 10, and 11.
Tadic was found guilty of persecution under Count 1 even for his relatively "inactive
participation."142 The tribunal looked to the context of the conflict in which discrimination
was prevalent, to determine that persecution on political, racial, and/or religious grounds
was satisfied by Tadic. In paragraph 689 the tribunal explains its analysis:
[Aliding and abetting includes all acts of assistance by words or acts that lend encouragement
or support, as long as the requisite intent is present. Under this theory, presence alone is not
sufficient if it is an ignorant or unwilling presence. However, if the presence can be shown or
inferred, by circumstantial or other evidence, to be knowing and to have a direct and substantial
effect on the commission of the illegal act, then it is sufficient on which to base a finding of
participation and assign the criminal culpability that accompanies it. 4
Tadic was not shown to have taken part personally in the rapes or mutilation, but it was
shown that: (1) he participated in imprisonment and seizure of the people in the camps,
(2) the Serbian forces' treatment of people in the camps was brutal, (3) he was aware of a
136. Askin, supra note 3, at 100-01.
137. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims





141. See Askin, supra note 3, at 102 n.31 (pointing out that the use of "imprecise and inappropriate" language
in international humanitarian law has led to confusion when sexual violence is charged: "When sexual violence
is committed, a charging of, e.g., 'outrages upon personal dignity' or 'humiliating and degrading treaunent'
not only mischaracterizes and obscures the nature of the crime, but also perpetuates destructive stereotypes by
treating rape as a crime against dignity or honor, instead of a crime of physical, mental, and sexual violence.").
142. Tadic, supra note 10.
143. Id.
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policy to discriminate against non-Serb people, and (4) he was criminally culpable with
regards to the sexual mutilation.' 44
Under Count 10 it was held that cruel treatment includes "inhumane acts" that cause
"injury to a human being in terms of physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity"
and that mutilation (in this case, sexual) constitutes an inhumane act. 4
Tadic was found guilty under Count 11, because the acts against the prisoners were
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population in which
"the accused intended for discriminatory reasons to inflict severe damage to the victims'
physical integrity and human dignity."'-
The prosecutor of the case, Alan Tieger, describes these and the other convictions as
follows:
[Tadic] ... was convicted of persecution of the Muslim and Croat communities of Prijedor, in
a municipality, northwest Bosnia ... [The court found] that among other things, he participated
in the round-up of Muslim civilians for placement in the camps after the shelling of their
homes; during that process, he murdered two policemen; he participated with an armed group
of men in the ethnic cleansing of a Muslim village, which left five of the men of the village
dead and the others taken away never to be seen again; he came to the Omarska camp, one of
the most notorious in the Balkan conflict, with a group of armed men who singled out de-
fenseless prisoners for beatings and torture with metal pipes, boots, and knives, culminating
in an attack that forced one prisoner to castrate another with his teeth.147
(ii) The Anto Furundzija Trial
Anto Furundzija was the local commander of a special unit of the military police of the
Croatian Defence Council (HVO) known as the "Jokers."' 4 He was arrested on December
18, 1997, by members of the multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR) pursuant to a war-
rant issued by the ICTY.'49 He was charged with grave breach of the Geneva Convention,
violations of the laws or customs of war (torture and inhumane treatment, torture, and
outrages upon personal dignity including rape) in connection with aiding and abetting acts
alleged to have happened at the "Jokers" headquarters. 50
The factual allegations include that in May 1993, Furundzija's unit arrested a woman
("Witness A") and took her to their headquarters where she was detained in the company
of a group of soldiers.' 5' Furundzija is alleged to have arrived to interrogate Witness A
about a list of Croatian names and the activities of her sons.' While he was present a
soldier beat Witness A and another witness, and then forced her to have oral and vaginal
intercourse with him. "The accused did nothing to prevent these acts.""'
The tribunal found him guilty on both the charges of grave breach and violations of the
laws or customs of war. 54
144. Id.
145. Id. 1 729.
146. Id. 730.
147. Alan Tieger, quoted in The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 13 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 1441, 1446 (1998).
148. Furundzija, supra note 10, 262.
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The most interesting aspect of this trial from the perspective of women's advocates is
that in June 1998, after the trial had been concluded, but before the verdict had been
rendered, the prosecution revealed to the defense that Witness A had been receiving coun-
seling for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) related to the rape and interrogation.'
The defense filed a motion to strike the testimony of Witness A, or in the event of a
conviction, to receive a new trial.16 The trial chamber found that the evidence about psy-
chological treatment was relevant to the issue of Witness A's credibility, and so reopened
the proceedings.' Significantly, after hearing the testimony of the prosecution that Witness
A's credibility was diminished as a result of her disease and therapy, the trial chamber
responded very strongly: "PTSD does not render a person's memory of traumatic events
unworthy of belief. In fact, the expert evidence indicated that intense experiences such as
the events in this case are often remembered accurately despite some inconsistencies.'
58
The trial chamber's findings on this matter include the following important statement
regarding the reliability of a witness suffering from PTSD: "The Trial Chamber bears in
mind that even when a person is suffering from PTSD, this does not mean that he or she
is necessarily inaccurate in the evidence given. There is not reason why a person with PTSD
cannot be a perfectly reliable witness."
59
d. Accomplishments of the ICTY in Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime
Tadic is an important but rather odd one for women's advocates, in that the most striking
convictions for sexual violence came as the result of Tadic's participation in the sexual
violence against other men. The two most important results of this trial for advocates of
victims of rape are: (1) that rape was declared a crime against humanity, marking the first
time in international war crimes trials that rape was specifically recognized as a war crime
offense; 16° and (2) that after Tadic: "anyone-including nonstate actors and low-level par-
ticipants-may be convicted of aiding and abetting crimes of physical, mental and sexual
violence through continued and knowing participation in, or tacit encouragement of, these
crimes.' 6' Another important precedent from Tadic is that sexual mutilation was specifically
found to be a violation of the laws and customs of war.
162
Although women's advocates criticize the trial chamber in the Furundzia trial for re-
sponding positively to the defense's motion on the issue of whether Witness A was com-
155. See HERMAN, supra note 12. She describes the psychological aftermath of prolonged abuse. Post Trau-
matic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is the psychiatric diagnosis given to a complex set of symptoms usually suffered
by persons who have undergone a trauma of a limited-time nature, for example, a rape, a disaster, or combat.
The symptoms of PTSD for a woman who has been raped are similar to symptoms of soldiers who suffer from
what was formerly called "shell shock": insomnia, nausea, startle responses, nightmares, dissociative disorders,
psychological numbing, intrusive memories, hyperarousal. Id. at 31, 35-36. Herman argues that the symptoms
of people who have undergone "prolonged, repeated trauma," such as victims of repeated sexual violence in
war-torn countries, are even more damaging than this. She proposes a new diagnosis for those who have a
"history of subjection to totalitarian control over a prolonged period ... including prisoners of war [and]
concentration camp survivors." Id. at 121. The symptoms of this disorder include: chronic suicidal preoccu-
pation; self-injury; explosive or extremely inhibited anger; reliving experiences; sense of helplessness, shame,
guilt, and self-blame; sense of defilement or stigma; and sense of complete difference from others. Id. at 121.
156. Furundzija, supra note 10, $ 105.
157. Id. 108.
158. Id. 1 105.
159. Id. 109.
160. Mills, supra note 105, at 66.
161. Aslin, supra note 3, at 105.
162. Id. at 102.
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petent, the trial chamber's final statement solidifies the position of all inevitably traumatized
witnesses in rape cases) 63 PTSD, by itself, is not enough to disqualify a witness.164
The most severe criticism of the ICTY's handling of rape and other sexual violence in
these and other trials comes from those who feel that despite the judges' intentions to the
contrary, the tribunal has still not dealt with the issue of gender violence directly or ade-
quately. For example, one commentary on the Tadic trial severely condemns the judges for
not breaking free from the constraints imposed by international law with respect to the
gender-neutral definitions of crimes-even in a context where sexual violence against
women was a major weapon of war:
[The trial chamber's] judgment perpetuates the inadequacies of international humanitarian law
with respect to the treatment of women. The judges' preliminary findings and their account
of the Serbian policies in which Tadic joined focus only on issues of ethnicity, race, religion,
or politics, but not gender ... The stories of how mass rape and its threat have been used in
the Balkans-as a tool of expulsion; of how forced impregnation became a weapon of genocide
and territorial and emotional conquest; of how sexual invasion has been employed as a device
to undermine the honor of both victim and her family and as symbolic castration of her
spouse-were not addressed in the tribunal's account of the rise of "ethnic conflict" in the
region.. .Guided by the gender-neutral definitions of relevant crimes, which fail to recognize
explicitly these acts as cognizable crimes, the narrow confines of the specific charges against
Tadic and the dismissal of the sole charge of rape, the Tadic bench suppressed the stories of
many victims in its preliminary findings. It rendered gender-specific violence and its many
forms of victimization nearly invisible.165
Even though advances were made for the cause of prosecuting rape as a war crime in
these two trials, the judges still seem not to have "gotten it" regarding the relative impor-
tance of the sexual crimes compared to the other kinds of crimes prosecuted. While several
rapes and incidences of sexual violence were prosecuted, the enormity of the situation and
the horrors involved in things such as rape camps and routine and systematic rapings of
women were never allowed to be addressed.166
2. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)167
The ICTR, based in Arusha, Tanzania, was created in 1994 by the U.N. Security Council
and given authority to prosecute serious violations of humanitarian law committed in
Rwanda (or outside the borders of Rwanda, if by a Rwandan citizen in 1994).68 Unlike the
ICTY, the ICTR was established to have jurisdiction in a conflict that was considered to
be "internal" and not "international." Therefore, the ICTR has more limited powers of
prosecution, and its jurisdiction does not include grave breaches that require international
armed conflict. 169
The ICTR was established to try defendants for crimes enunciated in articles 2-4 of its
Statute, which include: (1) genocide, (2) crimes against humanity, and (3) violations of
163. Id. at 165.
164. Furundzja, supra note 10, T 109.
165. Alvarez, supra note 52, at 2072-73.
166. Id.
167. ICTR Statute, supra note 8.
168. Id.
169. See Mills, supra note 105, at 51, 68.
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Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, which in-
corporates:
violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as
well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation .. .[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of
indecent assault. 
70
Under the ICTR Statute, the attack must be committed on national, political, ethnic, racial,
or religious grounds.
171
The tribunal has indicted forty-five individuals, thirty-eight of whom are in custody at
Arusha. 1'" The tribunal has convicted five individuals, including former prime ministerJean
Kambanda, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for genocide and crimes against hu-
manity, and Jean-Paul Akayesu, the mayor of a predominantly Hutu commune.'73
a. Jean-Paul Akayesu Trial
The Akayesu trial was the first international war crimes trial to try a defendant for the
crime of genocide.7 4 Akayesu was the burgermeistre (mayor) of the Taba commune. As
mayor, he had control over communal police and responsibility for maintaining public order
in the commune. 75 He allegedly abused this power by conducting house-to-house searches,
interrogating and beating people in an attempt to force them to reveal information about
others, and burning the homes and killing family members of individuals for whom he was
searching. 176 Five teachers were killed as a result of his encouragement to kill influential
and/or intellectual people.
177
During his trial, evidence of rape came forward and the trial was adjourned to investigate
crimes of sexual violence. 178 In June 1997, the indictment was amended to include charges
of sexual violence: "forcible sexual penetration of the vagina, anus or oral cavity by a penis
and/or of the vagina or anus by some other object, and sexual abuse, such as forced nu-
dity."' 7 9 The indictments included the following specific charges:
[when Tutsi civilian women sought refuge at the bureau communal building they were] reg-
ularly taken by armed local militia and/or communal police and subjected to sexual violence,
and/or beaten on or near the bureau communal premises ... Many women were forced to
endure multiple acts of sexual violence which were at times committed by more than one
assailant. These acts of sexual violence were generally accompanied by explicit threats of death
or bodily harm. The female displaced civilians lived in constant fear and their physical and
psychological health deteriorated. s0
170. See Askin, supra note 3, at 98 n.6.
171. Id.
172. Payne, supra note 95.
173. Id.
174. See Askin, supra note 3, at 105.
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Akayesu was accused of knowing sexually violent acts were being committed, and of being
present when some of these acts were committed or of "having facilitated the commission
of the sexual violence, beatings and murders by allowing the sexual violence and beatings
and murders to occur on or near the bureau communal premises" and of having encouraged
these acts by not preventing them. 8'
Five of the counts in the indictment against Akayesu were related to sexual violence:
Counts 1 and 2 alleged genocide (genocide and complicity in genocide); Count 3 alleged
crimes against humanity (extermination); and Counts 13 and 14 alleged crimes against
humanity (rape and inhumane acts).' 2
In its judgment against Akayesu,183 the tribunal found him guilty of encouraging rape
and stated: "Tutsi women were systematically raped .... Furthermore, it is proven that on
several occasions, by his presence, his attitude and his utterances, Akayesu encouraged such
acts .... In the opinion of the Chamber, this constitutes tacit encouragement to the rapes
that were being committed."'' 4
In addition, the tribunal established that these rapes and the other sexual violence against
Tutsi women were integral parts of the genocide committed in Rwanda:
[Rape crimes] constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were
committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted
as such. Indeed, rape and sexual violence certainly constitute ... one of the worst ways of
inflict[ing] harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm... Sexual
violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women
and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as
a whole ... [In Taba] [s]exual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the [T]utsi
group-destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.' 5
Akayesu was also found guilty of crimes against humanity for rape and other forms of
sexual violence, charged as rape (Count 13) and other inhumane acts (Count 14). When
the decision of the tribunal was announced, Akayesu became the first person convicted of
genocide by an international war crimes tribunal; he is currently appealing three life sen-
tences.1 6
b. Accomplishments of the ICTR Regarding Rape as a War Crime
The trial of jean-Paul Akayesu produced several major steps forward for the prosecution
of rape as a war crime. His was the first conviction for the crime of genocide, and, more
significantly, sexual violence was included as an integral part of that crime.8 7 The tribunal
also recognized rape and other forms of sexual violence as independent crimes under the
category of crimes against humanity.' Perhaps most importantly, the tribunal promulgated
a broad international definition of both rape and sexual violence: "a physical invasion of a
sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual vi-
181. Id. 12B.
182. Id.
183. Id. An appeal is pending.
184. Id. 11 733-34.
185. Id. 11 731-32.
186. Payne, supra note 95.
187. See Askin, supra note 3, at 107.
188. Id.
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olence[,] which includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is com-
mitted on a person under circumstances which are coercive."' 8
9
This definition is broad enough that a wide range of criminal sexual acts can be encom-
passed by it; it will assure that sexual violence can be prosecuted even if there was no rape,
per se. 190
V. Level Three Political Controversy: Establishing
Procedures to Protect Rape Survivor/Witnesses
One of the most important reasons to take rape as a war crime seriously is its lasting
effect on its survivors. Rape is a crime unlike most others in that it stigmatizes its victims. 191
Being the victim/survivor of rape affects a woman not only at the time of the attack, but
also throughout the rest of her life-damaging her psyche, isolating her from family and
community, and putting her at risk for further attacks. 192 Because of the continuing effects
of rape, especially great care must be taken so that, when rapists are prosecuted, survivors
are not further victimized. The continuing protection of women and other victims should
be a primary goal of any court or tribunal established to bring justice to a war-torn land.
Any legal action against the perpetrators of rape must make sure, at the least, that the victim
is not restigmatized. No healing can begin if the woman does not feel safe.
In the United States, years of legal reform have produced a system with rape shield
provisions designed to protect victims from experiencing the trial of the accused rapist as
a trial of her own character, reputation, and behavior. However, despite a number of re-
forms, victims remain reluctant to come forward or to press charges.' 9
When a woman comes forward with an accusation of rape (even after the positive con-
tributions of the rape reform movement of the last several decades), she is potentially ex-
posing herself to a frightening process of invasive medical investigations, interrogations,
and perhaps an unpleasant involvement with the court system. During a trial she will be
forced to relive the trauma in a public forum. This often means telling friends and relatives
who will have their own strong reactions to the attack, and may secretly or overtly hold
her responsible.-9 She may have been raped by an acquaintance or family member, and
therefore be reluctant to involve the police. 19 In the worst cases, it will mean making herself
the possible target of her attacker's revenge. 9 6 Above all, a woman knows that once she has
admitted being raped, she will be seen by many in her community as "tainted" or "un-
clean."'197 It is one of the few crimes that has the potential to revictimize its victims over
and over again.
Rape in wartime also has a devastating emotional impact on women. The Muslim woman
quoted at the beginning of this comment expressed a wish to die, or have her soul taken
189. Akayesu, supra note 178, J 598.
190. Id. at 109-110.
191. See HERMAN, supra note 12, at 67.
192. Id. at 159-62.
193. David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1194, 1221 (1997).
194. COLLEEN A. WARD, ATTITUDES TOWARD RAPE: FEMINIST AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
130-31 (1995).
195. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 193, at 1221-23.
196. Id. at 1221.
197. See HERMAN, supra note 12, at 67.
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from her198 Witness F in the Tadic trial refused to testify because of her fear, even after the
court had offered her some protections. 99 Witness A in the Furundzija trial was almost
disqualified because of her treatment for the mental disorder most often linked to a trauma
like rape, post-traumatic stress disorder.2°°
For some of the women, being given an opportunity to testify against their abusers will
aid in the process of healing; the prosecutor of the Tadic case describes the faces of witnesses
who had finished their testimony in that trial: "When [the witnesses testified] it was re-
markable how many of them reported the sense that they had been relieved of a heavy
burden that they had carried for a long time."2 1' For other women, testifying (or the thought
that they may be asked to testify) will only prolong the horror.
The political controversies associated with procedural aspects of rape in war crime trials
are numerous. They have to do with obtaining scarce resources and with marshalling those
resources properly and efficiently. 02 Most of all, they have to do with being sensitive to the
absolute horror with which most survivors of rape approach a judicial proceeding and the
idea that they will have to recount in graphic detail the crime that was committed against
them.203
In future war crimes trials, courts need to be continually aware (unless and until attitudes
about rape victims change dramatically) that when asking a rape survivor to testify against
the accused rapist, they are asking her, once again, to put her life, reputation, and mental
health on the line. In addition, in some cultures, they may be asking her to risk dishonoring
her family and community.2" 4
In light of these sacrifices that will be made by rape survivors who are willing to be
witnesses in these proceedings, procedures must be put into place that will protect them as
adequately as possible from shame and future harm. Scholars in this area and women's
advocates have proposed the following reforms for rape trials in international proceedings:
(1) More women who are sensitive to gender issues need to be a part of the process.20 5
As Jose Alvarez has noted, it is harmful to women to try international cases that include
sexual violence as if the sexual violence was merely a part of some other crime.2" 6 If the
sexual violence is moved to the background (in favor of analysis having to do with ethnicity,
religion, race, etc.), then women's voices and the true extent of their suffering are sup-
pressed. 07 Ironically, the inclusion of rape in an indictment can end up silencing victims if
the sexual violence is then made secondary to other crimes. In preparation for trials, in-
vestigators need to focus specifically on sexual violence. 0
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(2) Special sex crimes units should be established by the tribunals, which should be staffed
mostly by women. These women would be trained in investigating rape, and in questioning
rape survivors to elicit evidence in ways that empower rather than shame them. Sexual
violence is too often underreported; stories of rape and similar abuse are only revealed (if
at all) after thorough and sensitive questioning by people the victims trust.2 -
(3) The tribunals need to be given actual enforcement procedures and powers to allow
them to provide adequate witness protection. A witness protection provision is included in
both the ICTY and ICTR statutes, but neither tribunal was given the enforcement powers
to actually provide this protection. 10 The ICTY Victim Protection Unit has only two
people; the ICTR unit has none.2 '
The types of witness protection that have been provided were illustrated in the Tadic
trial-not publishing the victim's name; allowing the victim to remain anonymous (even to
the defendant) until the beginning of the trial; and keeping the whereabouts of the victim
and family secret." 2 These measures were not enough for the rape witness ("F") for whom
they were provided, however, and she declined to testify out of fear despite the measures." 3
Some witnesses have told the tribunals they were promised protective measures (such as
new names, homes, and identification papers), which they did not receive. Therefore, they
declined to testify.214 A recent observer of the tribunals has concluded that "[w]ithout some
kind of enforcement procedures and powers, the victim-witness unit does not seem to be
able to do more than offer verbal support and hand-holding for the witnesses."" 5
(4) Thomas Warrick, a U.S. Department of State Deputy for War Crimes Issues, em-
phasizes practical matters to enhance women's and their families' security.2 1 6 He suggests
unmarked cars for investigators to travel to women's homes.2' 7 Safe houses may often be
necessary for women, so their neighbors won't be aware that they are testifying.2 ' Inves-
tigators need to learn to meet witnesses in safe places.2' 9
(5) The tribunals need adequately staffed victims and witness units that are coordinated
with the prosecutor's offices.220 These units' functions would include: maintaining contact
with witnesses, working closely with them on day-to-day issues, arranging transportation
from the witnesses' homes to the tribunal, and accompanying them when necessary.22" ' They
would also arrange exit and entry permits, travel documents, safe conduct agreements, and
visas, along with transportation, safe housing, and protection during the trials.222 In the
past, volunteers have been relied on to fulfill these functions, with the result that witnesses
have not been adequately protected.22 3
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(6) Protection is necessary for women pre-trial, during the trial, and after the trial is
completed. 'here the local police are not supportive and will not protect her post-trial, a
witness's testimony must be kept secret.224
(7) Procedural rules need to be continually developed to protect victims. The Tadic trial
eliminated the need for corroboration of victim testimony.22 5 Other reforms including not
requiring a showing of victim resistance to the violence to prove rape, focusing on the
perpetrator's actions and not the victim's, and establishing a clear and convincing evidence
standard would also serve to protect witnesses and to allow them greater freedom to tes-
tify.
226
All of these reforms are based on the principle that a woman who is a victim of a violent
sexual crime in a time of war deserves a chance to testify against the perpetrator who has
harmed her. She deserves this chance to obtain justice without having to risk her life, health,
and security in any way that is not absolutely necessary. Some of the reforms are cost- and
labor-intensive. Others require a reorientation toward the primacy of sexually violent crimes
in the hierarchy of war crimes. Nevertheless, the tribunals and the future ICC must be
willing to fight the political battles necessary to meet the special needs of rape survivors
who are courageous enough to want to testify.
VI. Conclusion
There are many different levels of political controversy that need to be maneuvered
around in order to efficiently and responsibly prosecute rape and sexual violence as crimes
of war. The international tribunals and the future ICC deserve and need respect and support
from the international community in order to attain and maintain the status of legitimate
judicial bodies, and ultimately, to provide justice for victims, including victims of rape. The
tribunals need to continue down the path of defining sexual violence perpetrated during
armed conflict as war crimes, in and of themselves. They should investigate and prosecute
these crimes as aggressively as other atrocities. They also need to fight for the protection
and security of the witnesses, especially the victims of sexual violence. This must be done
through the continuing reform of the prosecutor's and investigator's offices, tribunal pol-
icies, and security procedures for those who testify; it will mean lobbying for more financial
and personnel support.
The international legal community must decide that these reforms and safeguards are
worthwhile if the prosecution of rape and sexual violence as war crimes is to continue. To
prosecute the crimes without providing adequate security and protection to the survivors
is to make them even more vulnerable. Adequate safeguards must be in place for each
survivor/witness and her family. When a victim's safety and life are at stake, limited or
merely symbolic victories can never be enough.
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